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Abstract:  
The main focus of this paper is the question as to what it is for an individual to think 
of her environment in terms of a concept of causation, or causal concepts, in contrast 
to some more primitive ways in which an individual might pick out or register what 
are in fact causal phenomena. I show how versions of this question arise in the 
context of two strands of work on causation, represented by Elizabeth Anscombe and 
Christopher Hitchcock, respectively. I then describe a central type of reasoning that, I 
suggest, a subject has to be able to engage in, if we are to credit her with causal 
concepts. I also point out that this type of reasoning turns on the idea of a physical 
connection between cause and effect, as articulated in recent singularist approaches of 
causation. 
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Causal Reasoning 
 
What is it for an individual to think of her environment in terms of a concept of 
causation (or, more generally, in terms of causal concepts1)? My aim in this paper is 
to draw attention to this question, which is not often discussed in contemporary 
debates about causation, and show how it might in fact be of some relevance to such 
debates.  
In the first two sections, my main focus will be on two, rather different, 
strands of work on causation, represented by Elizabeth Anscombe and Christopher 
Hitchcock, respectively. I will show how each, in its own way, raises the need to 
distinguish between the ability to use causal concepts and other, more primitive ways 
in which a subject might be able to pick out or register what is in fact a type of causal 
phenomenon without actually using causal concepts. I will also draw on some 
empirical work in psychology, especially developmental psychology, to illustrate the 
distinctions at issue.  
In the final section, I will sketch one way of connecting the issue as to what it 
is for an individual to have causal concepts with current debates about causation. I 
will suggest that a central type of reasoning that a subject has to be able to engage in, 
if we are to credit her with causal concepts, turns on the idea of a physical connection 
between cause and effect as articulated in recent singularist approaches to causation. 
 
1. Thick Causal Concepts 
Elizabeth Anscombe’s inaugural lecture ‘Causality and Determination’ is often seen 
as a paradigmatic statement of what has become known as singularism about 
                                                
1 See the next section for the relevance of this distinction. 
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causation, i.e. of the view that the truth of singular causal claims (such as ‘David’s 
smoking caused his heart disease’) does not depend on the existence of universal 
regularities or laws, and that general causal claims (such as ‘Smoking causes heart 
disease’) are generalizations over singular ones.2 In what follows, I will be interested 
primarily in two claims, or stages in Anscombe’s argument, and their relationship to 
one another. Consider the following, often-cited passage: 
 
The word ‘cause’ itself is highly general. How does someone show that he has 
the concept cause? We may wish to say: only by having such a word in his 
vocabulary. If so, then the manifest possession of the concept presupposes the 
mastery of much else in language. I mean: the word ‘cause’ can be added to a 
language in which are already represented many causal concepts. A small 
selection: scrape, push, wet, carry, eat, burn, knock over, keep off, squash, 
make (e.g. noises, paper boats), hurt. But if we care to imagine languages in 
which no special causal concepts are represented, then no description of the 
use of a word in such languages will be able to present it as meaning cause 
(Anscombe, 1971, p. 248). 
 
The issue at the forefront in this passage is not singularism as such. Anscombe’s main 
interest here is in a distinction that actually cuts across the distinction between 
singular and general causal claims. Following Cartwright (2004), I will characterise 
the distinction Anscombe has in mind as that between the thin concept ‘cause’, on the 
                                                
2 There are, in fact, several quite different strands to Anscombe’s paper, of which this is only one. One 
of the others, which I will set aside, is a denial of determinism, as it is not clear to me that the falsity of 
determinism would need to have the singularist consequences Anscombe thinks it does (see also 
Hitchcock 1995). 
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one hand, and thick concepts such as ‘scrape’, ‘push’, ‘wet’, etc., on the other.3 That 
this distinction does indeed cut across the one between singular and general causal 
claims can be seen from the fact that the thin concept ‘cause’, despite being ‘highly 
general’ in Anscombe’s sense, can still figure in singular causal statements (e.g. ‘The 
explosion of the space shuttle Challenger was caused by the failure of the o-rings on 
the right hand booster’); conversely, thick causal concepts can be used to make 
general causal statements (see, e.g., Cartwright’s, 2004, description of the workings of 
a carburettor).  
Nevertheless, the argument in the passage quoted above plays a key role in a 
larger argument for singularism. For Anscombe thinks that thick concepts such as 
‘scrape’, ‘push’, ‘wet’, etc. can be applied on the basis of observing particular 
instances of causal interactions without presupposing a relevant general causal claim. 
Thus, we seem to have here the elements required for fleshing out a version of the 
view that singular causal claims have a priority over general ones. Basically, the idea 
would be that thick concepts, applied in the context of observing particular instances 
of causation, are basic in our understanding of causal relationships in general, and that 
general causal claims should be seen as generalizations from such particular 
instances. 
Yet, it is possible to agree with the idea of a priority of thick concepts in our 
understanding of causal relations, and also with the idea that observation of 
circumstances in which such concepts apply plays a crucial role in such 
understanding, whilst nevertheless thinking that there is an important issue left 
unaddressed by Anscombe. Loosely speaking, the worry is that Anscombe has failed 
to show us what it is about a subject’s ability to recognize instances of scraping, 
                                                
3 Cartwright, in turn, adopts the “thick/thin” distinction from Williams (1985, p. 129), who introduces 
it in a discussion of ethical concepts, distinguishing “‘thicker’ or more specific ethical notions . . . such 
as treachery and promise and brutality and courage” from thin ethical notions such as good or ought. 
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pushing, wetting, etc., in virtue of which the subject can count as thinking of these 
instances in genuinely causal terms. For, intuitively, what her story leaves out is 
precisely what it is in virtue of which the subject understands that these are all forms 
of causing something.4 
To make the issue I have in mind more concrete, it might help to consider two 
studies on children’s understanding of causation carried out by Gelman, Bullock, and 
Meck (1980), and by Das Gupta and Bryant (1989), respectively. In Gelman et al.’s 
study, children were shown two pictures of an object, depicting the object before and 
after it had undergone a causal transformation (e.g. a picture of an apple and a picture 
of a wet apple), and they had to choose from an array of pictures of objects (e.g. a 
towel, a knife, a water jug) the right one to bring about the relevant transformation. 
Gelman et al. found that 3-year-olds were able to match objects to outcomes, and, 
conversely, were also able to match outcomes to objects.  
Das Gupta and Bryant’s (1989) study seems, on the face of it, only slightly 
more complex, but achieved rather different results. In this study, children again had 
to choose from an array of pictures of objects the right one to complete a sequence of 
three pictures, but this time the first picture in the sequence showed an object that had 
already undergone a causal transformation. Thus, the first picture might, for instance, 
be of a cut apple, and the last of a wet and cut apple. Das Gupta and Bryant tested 
both 3-year-olds and 4-year-olds and found that only the latter reliably succeeded in 
the task, whereas the former failed. 
                                                
4 Godfrey-Smith (forthcoming) raises a related worry in his critical discussion of what he calls ‘causal 
minimalism’. As he explains, “causal minimalism holds that to assert that some connection is causal is 
not to attribute some special empirical or modal feature to it. To call a connection causal is to say that 
this connection is one that can also be described using some unspecified member of [a set of causal 
verbs representing ‘special causal concepts’ in Anscombe’s sense]”. Like Godfrey-Smith, I don’t 
believe that minimalism is what Anscombe was actually after, so the issue I am raising is how she 
might manage to avoid it. Cartwright (2004) is probably the philosopher with the most explicit 
minimalist leanings, and I suspect she would accuse my way of framing the worry question-begging.  
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Now, Anscombe’s claim was that there are types of causation that are 
observable, and that there is a class of concepts, thick concepts, which can be applied 
on the basis of such observation without knowledge of a relevant general causal 
claim. The issue that Das Gupta and Bryant’s findings seem to make pressing, though, 
is how these two claims are related to each other. For it seems plausible to explain 3-
year-olds’ ability to pass Gelman et al.’s task by saying that they have seen instances 
of the relevant causal transaction before, and, on that basis, possess a type of 
knowledge that can guide selection of an object suitable for bringing about a certain 
result. Yet, Das Gupta and Bryant’s study suggests that this type of knowledge is, as it 
were, quite piecemeal, and does not equip the children with the ability to engage in 
certain, rather basic, forms of inferential reasoning about causal relations. And, at 
least on the face of it, this should hold us back from ascribing to the children concepts 
of the relevant causal relations, because it is concepts that are required for inferential 
reasoning. 
It might be useful to note a parallel between the issue I have just sketched and 
a similar issue that arises in connection with the relationship between shape 
perception and shape concepts. In ‘Things without the mind’, Gareth Evans writes:  
 
[I]t does not seem to be possible to regard the conception of the shape of a 
material thing – with all the propositions about its characteristic behaviour and 
interaction with other bodies which that implies – as the same as whatever 
shape concepts might be grounded in the colour mosaic thought to be given in 
immediate visual experience (Evans, 1985, p. 270). 
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Evans does not mean to deny, here, that shape properties can be perceived. Rather, his 
point is that our grasp of what it is for an object to be round, for instance, cannot be 
explained simply in terms of an ability to recognize perceptually instances in which 
that property is instantiated. Instead, such a grasp requires that one “master a set of 
interconnected principles which make up an elementary theory” (ibid., p. 269) into 
which the relevant property fits. 
A somewhat similar line of thought can be found in John Campbell (1995), 
who contrasts two different types of representation of shape, which differ according to 
the types of operations that can be performed on them.  
 
At the level of perception we have representations which are involved in 
imagistic reasoning: the rotations and zooms with which Shepard and others 
have made us familiar. And these representations are used in guiding action. 
Even an animal incapable of conceptual thought can engage in perceptually 
guided action. At the conceptual level we have representations which are 
involved in deductive reasoning: reasoning involving the application of the 
laws of logic. […] To have a shape concept is to be able to form 
representations of shape which can figure in deductive reasoning (Campbell, 
1995, p. 362).  
 
Intuitively, the findings on children’s developing understanding of causation 
mentioned above suggest that we need to make a similar kind of distinction between 
two types of reasoning, and correspondingly two types of representation, in the case 
of causal relations. Perceptually-based imagistic reasoning abilities may be sufficient 
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to pass Gelman et al.’s task, whereas Das Gupta and Bryant’s task may require 
deductive reasoning involving conceptual thought about causal relations. 
To make good such a suggestion, we need to say more about what might be 
the distinguishing features of reasoning that involves the use of causal concepts, and 
show how these features are present in Das Gupta and Bryant’s task. I will return to 
this issue in the final section of this paper. Before doing so, however, I want to turn to 
quite a different type of philosophical work on causation and show that it actually 
raises the same type of issue that I have just discussed in connection with Anscombe’s 
account, though in a slightly different guise. 
 
2. Causal Models 
In several recent papers, Christopher Hitchcock has extolled the virtues of causal 
models as tools for representing causal relationships (see, e.g., Hitchcock, 1995, 2001, 
2007). Causal models, which were originally developed in areas such as epidemiology 
and artificial intelligence (Pearl, 2000; Spirtes, Glymour & Scheines, 2000), typically 
consist in a directed graph, identifying a number of variables that are connected by 
directed edges (‘arrows’), and an accompanying set of structural equations, which 
specify the exact nature of the connection between variables. As such, they can be 
used to represent what is often called the causal structure of a given physical system 
by making explicit (often quite intricate) patterns of counterfactual dependence 
holding between different variables in the system.  
One important reason why Hitchcock is interested in causal models is that he 
thinks that, depending on context, common-sense judgements about causation 
typically focus only on one or another subset of the counterfactual relationships that 
hold in a given causal scenario, and using causal models can thus help us 
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disambiguate such judgements. There has also been increasing interest, however, in 
the connected idea that a basic form of mental representation governing causal 
learning embodies a causal model. In other words, the thought is that we can explain 
certain features of causal learning by postulating cognitive structures that represent 
causal structure in the manner of a causal model.5 
For the purposes of this paper, this latter idea is of particular interest because, 
as a device for representing causal relations, causal models might be seen to possess 
one feature that Anscombe’s account seemed to have difficulties providing for. Note 
that there appears to be a straightforward, and general, answer to the question as to 
why we should say that the relationships represented by causal models are represented 
as causal relationships. To quote Hitchcock: “The equations in the model represent 
causal structure […] because the equations provide information about the effects of 
hypothetical interventions, and about counterfactuals” (Hitchcock, 2007, p. 509, 
emphasis in the original). Obviously, there is considerable room for debate here as to 
what exactly this claim presupposes (and what it leaves open) about the relationship 
between causation, interventions and counterfactuals. For the sake of the argument, 
though, I will assume that it can be made good.  
Rather, I will focus on another feature of causal models that Hitchcock (2007, 
p. 510) himself notes: Just like Anscombe’s thick causal concepts, they can be used to 
capture both singular and general causal relationships. In this respect, causal models 
bear some resemblance to another sort of representation, namely maps.6 Perhaps we 
typically think of maps as representations of particular places, because we take as our 
paradigm geographical maps, which do represent particular places, but there are also 
                                                
5 Cf., e.g., Glymour (2001), Gopnik et al. (2004). 
6 Perhaps unsurprisingly, some theorists therefore also talk of ‘causal maps’ (see, e.g., Gopnik et al., 
2004). Another type of representation which shares this feature are scripts as described originally by 
Shank & Abelson (1972), and as explored in detail in developmental psychology by Nelson (1996); see 
also Hoerl & McCormack (forthcoming).  
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maps that represent general types of spatial arrangement. For instance, a budget hotel 
chain may have a map of the standard room layout they use, and there are anatomical 
atlases that show such things as maps of the human circulatory system. In other 
words, as a type of representation, maps are intrinsically neither particular nor 
general; they only become so if put to specific uses by us. The same, it seems, goes 
for causal models. I will call representations that share this feature ‘generic’, and I 
want to argue that being generic, in the sense just described, is a feature of 
representations that a subject can possess, and that allows that subject to be sensitive 
to the obtaining of certain relations in the absence of her possessing a concept of the 
relation in question.  
For an argument to that effect, applied to the case of maps, we can again look 
to work by John Campbell. Campbell (1994) picks up on work in comparative 
psychology, where animals are sometimes described as having a ‘cognitive map’ of a 
certain terrain. An animal might be said to have a cognitive map of a maze, for 
instance, because it is able to find the shortest way back to a food source at a 
particular location in the maze independently of where in the maze it is put. 
Campbell’s question is in what sense an animal in possession of a cognitive map, thus 
described, can itself be said to appreciate the connectedness of space, i.e. the fact that 
all the places represented on the cognitive map are spatially related to each other, and 
whether its doing so involves explicit reasoning involving spatial concepts. Taking 
one particular type of account of a cognitive map (involving the technical notion of a 
centroid) as his example, Campbell argues that    
 
the animal is not using reflective thought about its targets to assign causal 
significance to spatial relations: it does this rather through the fact of its own 
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engagement in the space. […] It is true that the vectors from the centroid to 
various cues do not depend on the location of the animal. But when we 
subtract the animal, we also subtract any physical meaning for those vectors. 
The vectors get their meaning only when the animal is plugged in. They have 
causal significance only through their relations to the animal’s perception and 
action (Campbell, 1994, p. 32). 
 
It seems to me that if it is legitimate to draw the type of distinction Campbell has in 
mind here in the case of cognitive maps, it should also be legitimate to draw a parallel 
distinction in the case of causal models. Roughly speaking, the idea would be that the 
grounds we might have for ascribing a causal model to a subject might not be 
sufficient for ascribing causal concepts to that subject, if the only way in which the 
model is put to use by the subject is in her own practical engagements with the world, 
without the subject herself being able to give significance to the idea that the same 
causal relations exploited in those practical engagements can also be present in 
circumstances in which there is no agent.  
 To make the issues at stake here more precise, it may help to note a difference 
between the kind of distinction I have in mind, between a purely practical grasp of 
causal relations and a capacity to employ causal concepts, and a perhaps similar-
sounding distinction drawn by James Woodward, whose own work makes use of 
causal models. Woodward (2007) distinguishes between three levels of causal 
understanding, or ‘causal viewpoints’, as follows: 
 
(1) [A] purely egocentic [causal viewpoint: The] agent grasps (or behaves as if 
it grasps) that there are regular, stable relationships between its manipulations 
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and various downstream effects but stops at this point, not recognizing (or 
behaving as though it recognizes) that the same relationship can be present 
even when it does not act, but other agents act similarly or when a similar 
relationship occurs in nature without the involvement of any agents at all. 
(2) [An] agent causal viewpoint:  the agent grasps that the very same 
relationship that it exploits in intervening also can be present when other 
agents act. 
(3) [A] fully causal viewpoint: the agent grasps that the very same relationship 
that he exploits in intervening also can be present both when other agents 
intervene and in nature even when no other agents are involved (Woodward, 
2007, p. 32). 
 
Woodward’s distinctions are meant to capture one way in which a subject’s causal 
understanding may be more or less sophisticated, depending on how closely tied up it 
is with the subject’s own capacities to act. What matters for the distinction between an 
egocentric and a non-egocentric causal point of view, in Woodward’s sense, is the 
type of information a subject can draw on in learning about causal relationships – 
whether it can only learn about them from its own interventions and their outcomes, 
or whether it can also use information from situations in which it did not intervene 
itself.  
There is, however, also another way in which a subject’s causal understanding 
may be more or less sophisticated, depending on how closely tied up it is with the 
subject’s own capacities to act. And this is the one at issue in what I have 
characterized as the distinction between being able to engage in reasoning involving a 
use of causal concepts, on the one hand, and more primitive ways of being sensitive to 
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causal relations, on the other.7 Consider Woodward’s description of a subject who 
possesses a fully causal viewpoint, in his sense, as “grasp[ing] that the very same 
relationship that he exploits in intervening also can be present both when other agents 
intervene and in nature even when no other agents are involved”. What I want to 
argue is that when it comes to spelling out the sense in which a subject might be said 
to have a grasp of the sameness of the relevant causal relationships, here, we need to 
draw a distinction that is analogous to the one at issue in the paragraph from 
Campbell cited above, where he contrasts two quite different ways in which a subject 
in possession of a cognitive map might be said to have a grasp of the connectedness 
of space. In both cases, we need to make a distinction between what could be called a 
purely practical grasp, and a grasp that involves the subject having a concept of the 
relationships in question (spatial and causal, respectively).  
A brief consideration of Woodward’s ‘agent causal viewpoint’ might help to 
bring out the point. A hallmark of an ‘agent causal viewpoint’, as Woodward 
explains, is the ability to learn about causal relations from the observation of other’s 
actions. Developmentally, some such ability already appears to be in place relatively 
early on. In experiments carried out by Andrew Meltzoff (1990), for instance, 14-
month-old children saw an adult touching the top of a box with his forehead, 
whereupon a light came on inside the box. They saw this action only once, and the 
box was removed as soon as the adult had performed the action, without giving the 
child the chance to touch the box herself. What Meltzoff found was that the 14-
month-olds, when re-introduced to the box after one week’s delay, reproduced the 
action they had seen the adult perform.  
                                                
7 Initially I thought that what Woodward was aiming at with his description of a ‘fully causal 
viewpoint’ was just the viewpoint of an agent who possesses causal concepts, as I understand it. 
However, an anonymous reviewer has persuaded me that this is not the case, and that the two issues are 
in fact orthogonal.   
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Meltzoff’s particular interest lies in the connection between children’s 
imitative abilities, as demonstrated in this study, and the development of what is 
typically called a ‘theory of mind’, i.e., a capacity to reason about oneself and others 
using mental and action-concepts. One possible position one might take here is that 
imitative abilities require a theory of mind, in the sense of an ability, on the part of the 
child, to work out through reflective reasoning that the same action that she sees the 
adult perform is also within her ability. However, on the basis of studies such as the 
one described above, as well as others that demonstrate basic imitative abilities 
already in newborns, Meltzoff argues against this view. Rather, he takes such studies 
to provide evidence for the innate presence of a common mental code, i.e. an 
underlying set of neural representations coding for certain aspects of goal-directed 
actions that are activated both when a child carries out an action herself, and when she 
sees the same action being performed by another person.  
Meltzoff likes to frame his own view in terms of the idea that children, more 
or less from birth, have a grasp of others as being ‘like me’, which is manifested in 
their imitative abilities. If the above is correct, however, it shows a way of 
understanding how a child might have a grasp of others being ‘like me’ that is not a 
matter of any ability, on the part of the child, to engage in reflective thought about the 
relationship between her own actions and those of others. Rather, in the case of 
imitation drawing on representations involving a common code for self-performed as 
well as observed actions, the child’s grasp of the other as being ‘like me’ may be a 
purely practical one, in the sense that the only way in which the child can put such 
representations to use may be in her own practical engagements with the world. In 
other words, the child’s sense of the other as being ‘like me’ may simply be exhausted 
by her ability to acquire certain pieces of practical knowledge through observation, 
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e.g. how to activate the light-box in Meltzoff’s (1990) experiment with 14-month 
olds.8  
In a similar way, I would argue that there could possibly be a number of ways 
in which a subject might acquire practical knowledge from observation of naturally 
occurring events in the environment without necessarily engaging in reflective 
thought about the relationship between those events and her own actions. Thus, when 
it comes to Woodward’s idea of a ‘fully causal viewpoint’, and the idea that a subject 
with such a viewpoint can grasp that the same relationship governing her own actions 
can also be present when no agent is involved, we can again distinguish between two 
forms such a grasp might take. The subject might be able to give substance to that 
sameness in reflective thought, or she might have a more basic, purely practical grasp 
of that sameness, which is simply exhausted by the ability to acquire practical 
knowledge through observation of naturally occurring events.  
 
3. Causing and Preventing 
In the preceding two sections, I have tried to bring into focus the question of what it is 
for a subject to possess causal concepts by highlighting two ways in which a subject 
might fall short of having such concepts despite being able to recognize or being 
sensitive to what are in fact causal phenomena. In the remainder of the paper, I will 
sketch a suggestion for an answer to the question as to what it is to possess causal 
concepts.  
 I shall take my lead from the final sentence of Anscombe’s ‘Causality and 
Determination’, which runs: “The most neglected of the key topics in this subject are: 
interference and prevention” (Anscombe, 1971, p. 258). The main focus in what 
                                                
8 I discuss the issues at stake here in more detail in Hoerl, 2002. 
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follows will be on the notion of prevention, though I should make clear at the outset 
that I am treating this notion as an example of a larger class. My suggestion, put very 
briefly, is that ascribing a grasp of causal concepts to an individual is, at least in part, 
a matter of thinking of that individual as being able to engage in a distinctive type of 
causal reasoning, of which reasoning about how a certain outcome might be prevented 
provides an example. In this type of reasoning, causal relations are themselves being 
conceived of as subject to conditions, such that it is possible to ask how A might be 
prevented from causing B, how one might enable A to cause B, or how else the 
relationship between A and B might be interfered with, such that A might bring about 
one effect rather than another.9 
To spell out this suggestion in more detail, it is important to distinguish 
between two quite different ways in which the notion of prevention might be 
understood. One of them is expressed in the following remark by Hitchcock: 
 
In our interventions in the world, we typically seek to promote those outcomes 
that we deem desirable and to prevent or inhibit those outcomes that we wish 
to avoid. Thus, we typically aim to prevent or inhibit thrombosis, while we 
may seek either to prevent or promote pregnancy, depending on our desires at 
a particular stage in our lives. […] Unfortunately, our language can be 
treacherous here, for we often use the word cause specifically to mean 
promote. In this usage, cause and prevent (or inhibit) are antonyms. 
                                                
9 The resulting account of causal concepts is likely to share certain features with manipulability 
theories of causation such as Woodward’s, in that it connects our grasp of causal relations to our ability 
to intervene in the world ourselves. But the type of intervention it focuses on is not the one captured by 
the notion of an intervention that is commonly used in manipulability theories. Put very crudely, the 
basic idea behind manipulability theories is that A causes B only if there is an association between A 
and B that is invariant under interventions on A (see Woodward, 2003, for an account that offers a 
considerable amount of refinement of this basic idea). By contrast, the notion of an intervention that is 
crucial in the present context is not that of an intervention on A, but rather that of an intervention that 
determines, on a given occasion, what effect A has, even if A cannot be (or is not) intervened on.     
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Nonetheless, prevention is a kind of causal relationship (Hitchcock, 2007, p. 
104). 
 
Hitchcock’s point is that causes can come in varieties that raise the chances of a 
certain outcome or varieties that lower the chances of a certain outcome, and that, for 
instance, the relationship between birth control pills and pregnancy is clearly a causal 
one, even though we ordinarily would not say that the former cause the latter. Within 
the framework used by Hitchcock, this ambiguity is resolved by distinguishing 
between preventing causes, which are conceived of as ones that lower the probability 
of a certain outcome, and promoting causes, which are conceived of as ones that 
increase the probability of the outcome.  
 The understanding of the notion of prevention at issue in Anscombe’s 
‘Causality and Determination’ is arguably very different from that just sketched. A 
key part of Anscombe’s argument is that singular causal truths cannot be understood 
as instances of universal generalizations because, for any putative causal relationship 
between an event A and an event B, we can imagine a situation in which A happens, 
but B does not because of some further cause, and there is no way of limiting the 
number of such other causes that might prevent B from happening.10  
  Setting aside the issue as to what exactly this argument establishes about the 
relationship between causation and universal generalizations, it brings out that there is 
a further dimension to common-sense uses of the notion of prevention that Hitchcock 
glosses over. An understanding of the notion of prevention that is more complex than 
that captured by the idea of a preventing cause, understood along Hitchcock’s lines, is 
expressed in sentences with a particular sort of grammatical structure, following the 
                                                
10 Russell (1913) makes what amounts to more or less the same point, but uses it to a different effect, 
viz. in support of an eliminativism about causation. See Field (2003) for discussion.  
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schema “A prevents B from x-ing C”. (Indeed, pace Hitchcock, it is likely that we 
actually have a version of this schema in mind when we think of the relation between 
taking birth control pills and getting pregnant.) The grammatical structure here 
describes not a relationship between two events (or event types), such as that of one 
event’s lowering the probability of another, but a relationship that obtains between an 
event (or type of event) and an occurrence of an instance (of a type) of causation. In 
what follows, I will mark that difference by speaking of the schema “A prevents B 
from x-ing C” as embodying the idea that causal relations are preventable.11  
Now, one interesting feature of the schema “A prevents B from x-ing C” is 
that it can be filled using both the thin concept ‘cause’ or one of Anscombe’s thick 
concepts to describe the prevented relationship between B and C. This might help us 
see a possible answer to a question we raised in connection with Anscombe’s account, 
i.e. the question of what it is about a subject’s ability to recognize instances of 
scraping, pushing, wetting, etc. in virtue of which the subject can be said to think of 
those instances in genuinely causal terms. One idea that Anscombe might avail herself 
of, in response to this question, is the idea that instances of wetting, pushing, scraping, 
etc. are thought of as causal by the subject in so far as the subject understands, for 
instance, that they are preventable (at least in principle), or that they can otherwise be 
interfered with. 
Again, we can perhaps make this suggestion more concrete by looking at the 
two studies on children that I mentioned in the section on Anscombe’s account. In 
Gelman et al.’s study, children were able to match an outcome to an object with the 
right kind of causal power to produce that outcome. Having some kind of grasp of the 
causal powers of objects in this sense, though, might be possible without grasping that 
                                                
11 Dowe offers a similar analysis of prevention in chapter 6 of Dowe (2000). 
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something might prevent the object from exerting its causal power, or how else the 
presence of other causes might affect the outcome. Das Gupta & Bryant’s study, by 
contrast, whilst not specifically dealing with children’s grasp of preventability, can 
nevertheless be seen as measuring their ability to appreciate the particular conditions 
that instances of causal relations may be subject to, such that, for example, whether an 
instance of pouring water over an apple produces a whole or a cut wet apple depends 
on what conditions the apple starts out in. Arguably, the reasoning here, involving a 
grasp of one sense in which a causal relationship can be interfered with, is structurally 
of the same type as that involved in grasping relations of preventability. 
Consider next the issues I raised in the section on causal models. The key 
issue was that a subject may possess a causal model and yet fall short of possessing 
causal concepts, if the only way in which the causal model is put to use by the subject 
is in her own practical engagements with the world. How, if at all, might the question 
as to whether the subject can grasp the idea of the preventability of instances of 
causation be relevant here? Consider the relationship between two events (or event 
types) as represented within a causal model. There may actually be nothing about that 
representation (specifying certain counterfactual relationships between the two 
events) that the idea of something preventing one of them from causing the other 
could get any purchase on.12 This is not to say that causal models are unable to 
represent a situation to which the schema “A prevents B from causing C” applies – 
doing so within a causal model usually involves introducing a further variable in 
                                                
12 The causal model might, of course, imply that we can, say, bring it about that the second event 
doesn’t happen by bringing it about that the first event doesn’t happen. But this is different from the 
notion of prevention as considered here, which is concerned with the question of how the second event 
might be prevented, even if the first does happen.  
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between B and C for A to influence.13 Rather, the point here is that the thought that 
any causal relation is in principle preventable involves a substantial theoretical 
commitment that goes beyond what is implied by the information about 
counterfactual relationships captured by a causal map. 
It is at this point, I believe, that the issues I have been raising connect in an 
interesting way with recent work on singular causation. I believe it is arguable that 
thought of causal relations as in principle preventable involves a commitment to a 
view of causation that is at least broadly of the same type as that advanced in recent 
philosophical accounts of singular causation, according to which singular causation 
involves, for instance, the interaction of continuous processes and the exchange of 
physical quantities such as energy or momentum  (Salmon, 1984; Dowe, 2000). 
Following Schaffer (2004), I will say that a common feature of such accounts is that 
they think of causes and effects as physically connected. It is this idea of a physical 
connection, however, that seems to be required to give substance to the thought that 
causal relations are in principle preventable.14 Above, I said that thinking of causal 
relationships as preventable is an instance of a distinctive type of reasoning about 
causation in which causal relations are themselves being conceived of as being 
subject to certain conditions. The idea of a physical connection, of an empirical 
feature by which causes need to be connected to their effects, is precisely what is 
needed to ground the idea of such conditions, and thus for this type of reasoning to get 
a grip. 
 To summarize, then, I have suggested that there is a particular type of 
reasoning that a subject needs to be able to engage in if she is to be credited with 
                                                
13 Interestingly, Woodward (2007) also notes the significance of a grasp of intermediate variables for 
what he calls a fully causal viewpoint, but the rest of his argument is somewhat different from the one 
presented here. 
14 and also for making intelligible, in the kind of case at issue in the Das Gupta & Bryant study, how 
the outcome of a causal intervention can differ depending on the presence of other causes.  
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causal concepts. In this type of reasoning, causal relations are themselves conceived 
of as being subject to certain conditions, such that it makes sense to ask how A might 
be prevented from causing B, how one might enable A to cause B, or how else the 
relationship between A and B might be interfered with. I have argued that there is a 
primitive ability to grasp the causal power of objects and there are abilities involving 
the use of a causal model that a subject can possess without being able to consider 
such questions and thus to think of causal relations as subject to conditions in this 
way. Conversely, I have tried to show that the latter abilities involve thought of 
causes and effects as being physically connected. Thus, if what I have argued is at 
least roughly along the right lines, having causal concepts turns on being able to 
engage in a type of reasoning that involves a commitment to the type of view of 
causal relations articulated by current singularist theories of causation. 
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